Imagine a sender holding two sealed envelopes — Message 0 and Message 1 — and a receiver who wants exactly one of them. The catch: the receiver must not learn the contents of the envelope they did not choose, and the sender must not learn which envelope the receiver took.
Both requirements sound contradictory. How can anyone hand over a message without knowing who is receiving it? This is the paradox at the heart of oblivious transfer (OT), a two-party cryptographic protocol with an almost magical guarantee.
Michael O. Rabin introduced the first version in 1981: a sender transmits a message that the receiver gets with probability one-half, and the sender never knows if delivery succeeded. Shimon Even, Oded Goldreich and Abraham Lempel sharpened this into the 1-out-of-2 form (1985) that is standard today: the receiver picks bit and learns precisely — nothing about , and the sender learns nothing about .
What makes OT remarkable is not just its elegance. In 1988, Joe Kilian proved that oblivious transfer is complete for secure computation: any function two parties want to compute jointly without revealing their private inputs can be built from OT alone. It is the hydrogen of cryptographic primitives — everything else is assembled from it.
Comments
Loading comments...