Bayes' theorem is proven — a straightforward consequence of the definition of conditional probability. There is no open question about whether it is true.
The formula is:
P(Disease∣Positive)=P(Positive)P(Positive∣Disease)×P(Disease)
Breaking it down:
- P(Disease) is the prior — how likely the disease is before any test result. This is the prevalence.
- P(Positive∣Disease) is the sensitivity — how often the test fires positive on someone who truly has the disease.
- P(Positive) is the total positive rate — the weighted sum of true positives and false positives over the whole population.
- P(Disease∣Positive) is the posterior — the probability you actually have the disease, given a positive result.
The key insight is the denominator. Even if the false positive rate is 1%, a 1-in-10,000 prevalence means roughly 100 false positives for every 1 true positive in a screened population. The posterior probability for a random positive is therefore about 1%.
Status: solved. Bayes' theorem was proven by Thomas Bayes (posthumous essay, 1763) and generalized by Pierre-Simon Laplace (1812). It is now a foundational identity of probability theory, taught in every statistics course and embedded in every field that reasons under uncertainty.
The hard part is not the formula — it is the human part: accepting that our intuitions about probability are systematically wrong, and disciplining ourselves to track the prior. See also how P vs NP shows a similar gap between what seems hard and what is actually provable.
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